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A HUMANITARIAN EXCEPTION: THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL JUSTIFICATION FOR U.S.
MILITARY ACTION AGAINST THE SYRIAN REGIME
Vincent Nordin*
The United Nations Charter provides that countries are prohibited
from the use of force except when done in self-defense or when
authorized by the United Nations Security Council. Although the United
States’ airstrikes against Syria in 2017 and 2018 did not fit into either
of those two exceptions, the airstrikes were legal under international law
due to an exception for humanitarian intervention. The question of
whether customary international law recognizes such an exception is far
from settled. Most scholars of international law believe that
humanitarian intervention is not a part of customary international law,
while a minority hold the opposite view. This Article sides with the
latter. It argues that an exception for humanitarian intervention exists
as part of customary international law because such interventions are a
widespread practice among states and are accepted as law by a
sufficient number of states. Additionally, the adoption of such an
exception would lead to a more just world because it would allow states
to intervene to stop or mitigate humanitarian crises. There are,
naturally, risks associated with the adoption of a humanitarian
exception, such as states abusing the exception to pursue less than
altruistic goals. That risk, however, can be mitigated by adherence to
guidelines that humanitarian interventions would have to meet in order
to be legal. Applying the set of guidelines from the Responsibility to
Protect, U.S. airstrikes against Syria in 2017 and 2018 would be a legal
humanitarian intervention.

* Managing Editor, SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW Volume 61. J.D. Candidate, Santa
Clara University School of Law 2021. I would like to thank Professor David L. Sloss for his
help and guidance in writing this Article.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Syrian Civil War has claimed the lives of more than four
hundred thousand people since it began in 2011.1 Many of those deaths
were civilians killed during Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s
campaign to regain control of the country.2 The U.S. responded by
conducting airstrikes against the Syrian regime, once after a chemical
weapons attack in 2017 that killed over eighty civilians and again after
another chemical attack in 2018 that killed more than forty civilians.3
This presents the question of whether the strikes were legal under
international law. The U.N. Charter prohibits the use of force but
provides exceptions for when force is used in self-defense or when
authorized by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Even
though the U.S. airstrikes did not fit into either of those exceptions, this
1. Global Conflict Tracker: Civil War in Syria, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL.,
https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-syria (last updated Apr. 9,
2021).
2. See The Editors of Encyclopaedia Brittanica, Syrian Civil War, BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/event/Syrian-Civil-War/Civil-war (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).
3. Helene Cooper et al., U.S., Britain and France Strike Syria Over Suspected Chemical
Weapons
Attack,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
13,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/13/world/middleeast/trump-strikes-syria-attack.html;
Syria
chemical
‘attack’:
What
we
know,
BBC
(Apr.
26,
2017),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39500947.
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Article argues the strikes were legal due to the customary international
law exception to the U.N. Charter’s prohibition on the use of force—
humanitarian intervention.
This Article will proceed by explaining the background of the
Syrian Civil War and President Assad’s use of chemical weapons against
civilians. It will then discuss when the U.N. Charter allows for the use
of force, and the current scholarship on whether an exception for
humanitarian intervention exists as part of customary international law.
Recognizing that most scholars do not think such an exception
exists, this Article will show how the customary international law
exception for humanitarian intervention has come into being. In order
for a practice to become a part of customary international law it must be
(1) a widespread practice among states and (2) accepted as law by states.
Humanitarian intervention meets both those criteria. As to the first point,
evidence of state practice exists in the Cold War era as illustrated by
India’s intervention in East Pakistan, Tanzania’s intervention in Uganda,
and Vietnam’s intervention in Cambodia.4 The most important example
of state practice emerged in the post-Cold War era when the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervened to stop the
humanitarian crisis in Kosovo.5 As to the second point, humanitarian
intervention is sufficiently, though certainly not universally, accepted by
states as law. The United Kingdom (U.K.) and Belgium have viewed
humanitarian intervention as legal since Kosovo.6 The United States’
position is less clear, though it is accepting of the legality of
humanitarian intervention. Furthermore, retroactive praise from states
following humanitarian interventions is evidence of yet more states’
implicit support for the legality of humanitarian intervention.
This Article will then provide a policy argument to lend support for
the idea that humanitarian intervention should exist as part of customary
international law. Indeed, the benefits of the existence of such an
exception outweigh its disadvantages and would result in a more just
world. Recognizing the existence of the exception would allow states to
halt or mitigate humanitarian crises. Although the possibility that states
may abuse humanitarian interventions to achieve their strategic goals
remains, these concerns can be lessened by the presence of guidelines
that states would have to meet for their actions to be legal. The final
portion of the policy argument will examine how adherence to one set of
guidelines set out in the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), would allow for

4. See infra Section IV.B.
5. See infra Section IV.B.
6. See infra Section IV.C.
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legal humanitarian interventions like the U.S. airstrikes against Syria but
would not allow for actions like Russia’s annexation of Crimea.
II. BACKGROUND: THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR
Demonstrations against President Bashar al-Assad’s regime in
Syria began in March 2011 as part of a larger political upheaval
sweeping the Middle East—the Arab Spring.7 What ensued was a multifaction civil war.8
Since the beginning of the war, the Assad regime was accused of
committing war crimes against Syrian civilians.9 On August 20, 2012,
“President Obama threaten[ed] to act militarily if Syria cross[ed] a ‘red
line’ and use[d] chemical weapons.”10 While initial reports of the Assad
regime’s use of chemical weapons had surfaced earlier, the most serious
incident involved a sarin gas attack in August 2013 “that killed more
than 1,400 civilians in the Damascus suburb of Ghouta.”11 Appearing as
though President Obama’s “red-line” had been breached, the U.S. did
not engage in a military strike against the Assad regime.12 Instead, the
Obama administration decided on a diplomatic solution in which Assad
agreed to relinquish his chemical weapons stockpile under a United
Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR).13
Bashar al-Assad, however, did not comply with the agreement. On
April 4, 2017, Assad again used chemical weapons against civilians in
the northern Idlib province, which resulted in the deaths of eighty-eight
people.14 Bashar al-Assad refused to accept responsibility for the attacks

7. Why has the Syrian war lasted 10 years?, BBC (Mar. 12, 2021),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35806229; Mona Yacoubian, Syria Timeline:
Since the Uprising Against Assad, U.S. INST. PEACE (Jan. 1, 2021),
https://www.usip.org/syria-timeline-uprising-against-assad.
8. See Alicia Sanders-Zakre, What You Need to Know About Chemical Weapons Use in
Syria, ARMS CONTROL ASS’N, https://www.armscontrol.org/blog/2018-09-23/what-youneed-know-about-chemical-weapons-use-syria (last updated Mar. 14, 2019).
9. Ved P. Nanda, The Future Under International Law of the Responsibility to Protect
After Libya and Syria, 21 MICH. ST. INT’L. L. REV. 1, 14-20 (2013).
10. Haley Bissegger, Timeline: How President Obama handled Syria, HILL (Sept. 15,
2013, 10:00 AM), https://thehill.com/policy/international/322283-timeline-of-how-presidentobama-handled-syria-.
11. Sanders-Zakre, supra note 8.
12. Id.
13. See id.
14. Julia Masterson, Timeline of Syrian Chemical Weapons Activity, 2012-2020, ARMS
CONTROL ASS’N, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-Syrian-ChemicalWeapons-Activity (last updated May 2020); Chain of events after suspected Syria chemical
attack,
NEW
INDIAN
EXPRESS
(Apr.
26,
2017,
9:34
PM),
https://www.newindianexpress.com/world/2017/apr/26/chain-of-events-after-suspectedsyria-chemical-attack-1598047—1.html.
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and disputed them as a “fabrication.”15 Similarly, Russia stated that the
Syrian Air Force had struck a terrorist weapons depot that housed the
chemical munitions, which in turn released them.16 Those assertions,
however, were not credible. In October 2017, a joint investigative
mechanism between the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons (OPCW) and the United Nations found the Assad regime
guilty of conducting the April 4 attack.17 The OPCW is the international
body designated to implement the Chemical Weapons Convention, an
agreement to which the United States, Russia, and Syria are parties.18 In
response to the attack on April 4, President Trump ordered a strike on
the Shayrat airbase, which was believed to be the launch site of the
chemical weapons attack.19
Approximately a year later, Assad again used chemical weapons
against civilians, this time near Damascus, which killed forty-two
people.20 On April 14, 2018 the U.S., as well as France and the United
Kingdom, launched an attack against the Assad regime’s chemical
weapons infrastructure.21 The strike hit a “scientific research center in
Damascus, [a] chemical weapons storage facility, located west of Homs,
[a]nd a chemical weapons equipment storage facility and command post
near Homs.”22
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE LEGAL PROBLEM
The discussion above raises the question of whether the Trump
administration’s military strikes against the Syrian regime violate
international law.
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter prohibits the “threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state[.]”23

15. Syria chemical ‘attack’, supra note 3.
16. Id.
17. Masterson, supra note 14.
18. Chemical Weapons Convention Signatories and States-Parties, ARMS CONTROL
ASS’N, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/cwcsig (last updated June 2018).
19. Timeline: US intervention in Syria’s war since 2011, AL JAZEERA (Oct. 7, 2019),
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/10/timeline-intervention-syria-war-2011191007190255685.html.
20. Ben Hubbard, Dozens Suffocate in Syria as Government Is Accused of Chemical
Attack,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
8,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/08/world/middleeast/syria-chemical-attack-ghouta.html.
21. Timeline: US intervention in Syria’s war since 2011, supra note 19.
22. James Griffiths & Laura Smith-Spark, What we know about the Syria strikes, CNN
(Apr. 14, 2018, 4:37 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/14/middleeast/syria-strikes-whatwe-know-intl/index.html.
23. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
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This prohibition is accepted as jus cogens,24 which means that the
concept is so fundamental to the inter-relationship of states that a state
cannot deviate from it.25 There are, however, two U.N. Charter based
exceptions from the general prohibition. First, pursuant to Chapter VII,
a state may use force if the United Nations Security Council provides
authorization.26 Second, pursuant to Article 51 a state, or collection of
states, may use force in self-defense in response to an armed attack.27
There is, nevertheless, the possibility that humanitarian
intervention could still comply with international law if such an
exception could be deemed to be customary international law. A
practice becomes a part of customary international law when two
elements are met; there must be (1) a general practice among states and
(2) a belief among states that such practice is legally authorized, also
known as opinio juris.28 Regarding the first element, the practice must
be sufficiently widespread as well as consistent.29 Regarding the second
element, the practice must be undertaken “with a sense of legal right or
obligation.”30
The majority view among international law scholars is that
humanitarian intervention is not a part of customary international law.31
This camp of scholars argues that there can be no humanitarian
intervention exception to the United Nations Charter’s prohibition on the
use of force because the requisite elements needed to establish a practice
as part of customary international law are simply not met.32 One scholar,
Derek Jinks, encapsulates the majority’s position on the issue of state
practice. He refuses to accept that there is an exception for humanitarian
intervention because “state practice regarding the legality of
humanitarian intervention at present is neither sufficiently extensive nor
sufficiently uniform to support the conclusion that the [United Nations]
Charter permits it.”33 Other scholars, such as Dapo Akande, argue that
24. Daniela Abratt, U.S. Intervention in Syria: A Legal Responsibility to Protect?, 95
DENV. L. REV. 21, 36 (2017); Dapo Akande, The Legality of Military Action in Syria:
Humanitarian Intervention and Responsibility to Protect, BLOG EUR. J. INT’L L. (Aug. 28,
2013), https://www.ejiltalk.org/humanitarian-intervention-responsibility-to-protect-and-thelegality-of-military-action-in-syria/.
25. SEAN D. MURPHY, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 106 (3d ed. 2018).
26. See U.N. Charter art. 42.
27. U.N. Charter art. 51.
28. MURPHY, supra note 25, at 102, 104.
29. Id. at 102.
30. Id. at 104.
31. Richard B. Bilder, Kosovo and the “New Interventionism” Promise or Peril?, 9 J.
TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 153, 161 (1999).
32. See id. at 161.
33. Goodman, What Do Top Legal Experts Say About the Syria Strikes?, JUST SECURITY
(Apr. 7, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/39712/top-legal-experts-syria-strikes/.
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“there is little opinio juris on which a doctrine of customary international
law might be based.”34 Indeed, scholars point to the fact that the only
member of the United Nations Security Council, and major nation in
general, to explicitly support the idea of a humanitarian intervention
exception under customary international law is the United Kingdom.35
Opponents of the humanitarian intervention exception also argue
against accepting the legality of such a practice on policy grounds. The
main thrust of this argument is based on the idea that powerful states
could abuse humanitarian intervention to pursue less than altruistic
goals, which would in turn create a more chaotic and less just world.36
The most heinous example of this occurred in 1939, when Nazi Germany
annexed the Sudetenland in order to protect ethnic Germans living there
and then subsequently invaded the rest of Czechoslovakia.37 Scholars in
this camp also raise the question of what is truly just and moral.38 During
the NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999, for example, President Clinton
was assured that the United States and its allies had “done the right
thing” by stopping Slobodan Milosevic from completing his objective of
ethnically cleansing Kosovo.39 While that view was certainly shared by
many around the world, there was also another view of NATO’s
intervention in Kosovo. Richard Bilder expressed this view in an
interesting analogy to antiquity:
From [nonwestern governments’] standpoint, the relevant analogy
was not the United States and NATO cavalry bravely riding to the
rescue of about to be butchered, helpless, decent settlers, but of an
arrogant and bullying Imperial Rome, with its docile and subservient
“allies” in tow, launching a brutal punitive expedition against a small
and weak nation that had the temerity to try to preserve its
sovereignty and defy Rome’s ultimatums and hegemony—in the
process devastating its territory, killing and humiliating its people,
and seeking to capture and bring its leaders in chains to Rome—read,
the Hague—as a lesson to others.40

Perhaps the analogy indulges in some hyperbole, but it does present a
relevant concern that many states around the world have about
humanitarian intervention. When does a situation rise to the requisite

34. Akande, supra note 24.
35. See, e.g., id.
36. Bilder, supra note 31, at 160-61.
37. Id.; see generally History.com Editors, Nazis take Czechoslovakia, H ISTORY ,
https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/nazis-take-czechoslovakia (last updated July 28,
2019).
38. See Bilder, supra note 31, at 160.
39. Id. at 153.
40. Id. at 154.
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level of moral necessity to warrant a humanitarian intervention by
foreign powers? To what extent will those powers use such interventions
to pursue their own, non-humanitarian, policy goals?
On the other hand, a minority of scholars view humanitarian
intervention as a part of customary international law. One of those
scholars, Sir Daniel Bethlehem, argued that humanitarian intervention
has become an exception under customary international law because of
the confluence of several “threads” that although “fragile” and not
compelling in isolation, become “robust and compelling” when woven
together.41 The eight threads that constitute Sir Bethlehem’s strand are:
(1) the United Nations objective as stated in its preamble to “reaffirm
faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human
person”; (2) the “last resort right of States to act in situations of distress
. . . and circumstances of necessity,” as recognized by international law;
(3) the international legal concept that egregious and illegal acts by states
cannot go unaddressed; (4) examples of states engaging in humanitarian
intervention, such as Vietnam invading Cambodia; (5) the 1991 no-fly
zone over Iraq; (6) NATO’s 1999 Kosovo intervention; (7)
Responsibility to Protect (which will be explained later in the Article);
and (8) developments in international criminal law.42
Along a similar vein, some scholars in this camp, such as Milena
Sterio, have argued that the rapid acceptance and states’ willingness to
engage in humanitarian interventions constitutes what they term “a
Grotian moment.”43 The term is named after the Dutch Scholar Hugo
Grotius, who is often credited with creating modern international law.44
A Grotian moment means a transformative development in which new
rules and doctrines of customary international law emerge with unusual
rapidity and acceptance.45 As the argument goes, NATO intervention in
Kosovo was a watershed moment.46 Although the bombing campaign
aimed at preventing Yugoslav forces from perpetrating a humanitarian
crisis in Kosovo did not have authorization from the United Nations
Security Council, “the global consensus on [the] intervention was that it
was ‘unlawful but legitimate.’ ” 47 This in turn sparked the creation of
the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, which attempted to refashion the
41. Daniel Bethlehem, Stepping Back a Moment – The Legal Basis in Favour of a
Principle of Humanitarian Intervention, BLOG EUR. J. INT’L L. (Sept. 12, 2013).
42. Id.
43. See generally Milena Sterio, Humanitarian Intervention Post-Syria: A Grotian
Moment?, 20 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 343 (2014).
44. Id. at 344.
45. Id. at 344-45.
46. Id. at 347.
47. Id.
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way states in the international system viewed their sovereignty and also
authorized humanitarian interventions in limited circumstances.48 Other
scholars, like Harold Koh, follow a similar line of reasoning.49 He
argues that Kosovo was a watershed moment for the development of
humanitarian intervention in customary international law, and that the
Responsibility to Protect shifted the view of humanitarian intervention
from states’ right to intervene, to a “collective notion that the
international community has a duty or ‘responsibility to protect’ a
nation’s citizens when the national government has undeniably forfeited
that responsibility.”50
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Authorization by the United Nations Security Council and SelfDefense
The Trump administration’s humanitarian interventions in 2017
and 2018 would be illegal under the U.N. Charter.
First, the United States did not receive UNSC authorization to use
military force against Syria.51 This was not for a lack of trying.52 Russia
and China have partnered in vetoing various Security Council
Resolutions authorizing the use of force against Syria for its use of
chemical weapons against civilians.53 For example, the veto of Security
Council Draft Resolution (S/2017/172) on February 28, 2017, marked
the seventh time that Russia had vetoed an attempt at Security Council
authorization and the sixth time China had done so.54
Second, the United States did not act in self-defense. Syria’s use of
chemical weapons was part of an intrastate conflict affecting Syrian
civilians and was not a direct attack on the U.S. or its allies.55 Although
during an interview with CNN, President Obama implied that the U.S.
would be acting in self-defense since core U.S. interests were implicated
48. Id. at 347; see generally INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY,
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (2001) [hereinafter R2P].
49. Harold Hongju Koh, Syria and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention (Part II:
International Law and the Way Forward), JUST SECURITY (Oct. 2, 2013),
https://www.justsecurity.org/1506/koh-syria-part2/.
50. Id.
51. Michael Schmitt & Chris Ford, The Use of Force in Response to Syrian Chemical
Attacks: Emergence of a New Norm?, JUST SECURITY (Apr. 8, 2017),
https://www.justsecurity.org/39805/force-response-syrian-chemical-attacks-emergencenorm/.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.; Akande, supra note 24.
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by the chemical weapons attack, such a connection is tenuous at best.56
While it is true that the U.S. seeks to stop the proliferation of chemical
weapons and to protect its allies near Syria, there remains no serious
threat or actual use of chemical weapons against the U.S. or its allies in
the region such as Turkey and Israel.57
B. Customary International Law: State Practice
In order to be legal, U.S. military action against the Assad regime
must fit into a customary international law exception to the prohibition
on the use of force. Customary international law provides such an
exception for humanitarian intervention outside the framework of the
U.N. Charter. The first step in establishing that such humanitarian
intervention is part of customary international law is showing that such
action is a general practice among states.58 This is arguably the case with
respect to humanitarian intervention.
There are three clear examples of states engaging in humanitarian
interventions in the Cold War era. First, India’s intervention into East
Pakistan, now known as Bangladesh, in order to stop the genocide
against the largely Hindu Bengali minority.59 The Indian government
justified its military action, in part, by presenting Pakistan’s military
oligarchy as analogous to Adolf Hitler’s Third Reich.60 It additionally
circulated a then secret, though now public, report among Indian
leadership describing the purpose of the intervention as saving the
population of East Pakistan from a genocide directed by the Pakistani
government.61 Second, Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in response to
the genocide perpetrated by the communist Khmer Rouge regime.62 Pol
Pot, Cambodia’s Marxist leader, killed approximately two million of his
own people and was only stopped in 1979 when Vietnam invaded and

56. See Alan Silverleib, Exclusive: Obama tells CNN key decisions nearing on Syria,
Egypt, CNN (Aug. 23, 2013, 3:01 PM), https://edition.cnn.com/2013/08/23/politics/obamacnn-new-day-interview.
57. See Oona A. Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, Opinion, On Syria, a U.N. Vote Isn’t
Optional, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/04/opinion/onsyria-a-un-vote-isnt-optional.html?hp.
58. MURPHY, supra note 25, at 102.
59. Gary J. Bass, The Indian Way of Humanitarian Intervention, 40 YALE J. INT’L L.
227, 253-55 (2015).
60. Id. at 253.
61. Id.
62. See Abratt, supra note 24, at 47.
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deposed him.63 Third, Tanzania’s invasion of Uganda and the overthrow
of Idi Amin’s regime on humanitarian grounds.64
NATO’s air campaign over Kosovo provides an example of states
engaging in humanitarian intervention during the post-Cold War era.65
On March 24, 1999, nineteen NATO members began Operation Allied
Force to prevent the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s (hereafter
“Serbia”) ethnic cleansing of Albanians living in Kosovo.66 The
bombing campaign focused on Slobodan Milosevic’s regime and its
capacity to carry out its ethnic cleansing objective in Kosovo.67 By early
June 1999, Serbia had capitulated and agreed to a phased withdrawal
from Kosovo.68
One may counter by arguing that state practice has not been
established because evidence of states engaging in humanitarian
intervention outside the U.N. framework is not sufficiently widespread
or consistent. Many scholars of international law—such as Oscar
Schachter,69 Dapo Akande,70 and Derek Jinks71—have made such a
claim. While superficially plausible, this contention is unpersuasive
because opportunities to engage in humanitarian intervention outside the
U.N. framework are infrequent.72 In order for there to be an opportunity
for a state to engage in humanitarian intervention there needs to be (1) a
state perpetrating a humanitarian crisis and (2) a permanent member of
the UNSC willing to use its veto to prevent authorization of the use of
force against that state. Libya is one example, among many, where a
humanitarian intervention outside the U.N. framework could have
occurred but did not due to Libya’s lack of backing by a permanent
member of the UNSC.73
63. Id.; Khmer Rouge: Cambodia’s years of brutality, BBC (Nov. 16, 2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-10684399.
64. See Farooq Hassan, Realpolitik in International Law: After Tanzanian-Ugandan
Conflict “Humanitarian Intervention” Reexamined, 17 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 859, 865
(1981).
65. Koh, supra note 49.
66. Schmitt & Ford, supra note 51; BENJAMIN S. LAMBETH, NATO’S AIR WAR FOR
KOSOVO: A STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT v, xvii (2001).
67. Bilder, supra note 31, at 153.
68. Note on NATO’s Intervention in Kosovo, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 1130, 1132 (Lori Damrosch & Sean Murphy eds., 7th ed. 2019).
69. Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1129, 1129-30 (Lori Damrosch & Sean Murphy eds., 7th ed.
2019).
70. See Akande, supra note 24.
71. See Goodman, supra note 33.
72. See Jayshee Bajoria & Robert McMahon, The Dilemma of Humanitarian
Intervention, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/dilemmahumanitarian-intervention (last updated June 12, 2013, 8:00 AM).
73. See Abratt, supra note 24, at 48-49, 54.
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C. Customary International Law: Opinio Juris
The second element necessary to establish a practice as part of
customary international law is opinio juris, or that states accept the
practice as law.74 While there is certainly no global consensus on the
legality of humanitarian intervention,75 a significant number of states,
including three permanent members of the United Nations Security
Council, view such action as legal.
The U.K.’s public position on humanitarian intervention is the
clearest example of the legality of such a practice. Despite lacking
UNSC authorization for NATO’s operation in Kosovo, the U.K.’s
Secretary of State for Defense, George Robertson, stated, “[w]e are in
no doubt that NATO is acting within international law and our legal
justification rests upon the accepted principle that force may be used in
extreme circumstances to avert a human catastrophe.”76 In 2017, the
U.K.’s Attorney General, Jeremy Wright, reiterated his country’s
position that humanitarian intervention, in exceptional circumstances,
exists as a customary law exception to the U.N.’s prohibition on the use
of force.77
Belgium has also explicitly supported the idea that humanitarian
intervention serves as an exception to the U.N.’s prohibition on the use
of force. During its oral defense before the International Court of Justice
on the Legality of Use of Force against Yugoslavia, Belgium presented
the argument that NATO’s actions were justified by past precedent of
states acting on the grounds of humanitarian necessity without UNSC
authorization.78
Furthermore, other NATO members’ participation in the bombing
of Serbia provides tacit support for the humanitarian intervention
exception under customary international law. As the U.S. Assistant
Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor during the
Kosovo campaign noted in hindsight, all the members of NATO that
participated in bombing Serbia accepted the legality of humanitarian
intervention without UNSC approval.79 Certainly, no NATO member
thought its actions against Serbia were illegal.
74. MURPHY, supra note 25, at 104.
75. See, e.g., Schachter, supra note 69, at 1129.
76. Note on NATO’s Intervention in Kosovo, supra note 68, at 1132.
77. Jeremy Wright, Attorney Gen., U.K., Attorney General’s Speech at International
Institute for Strategic Studies: The modern law of self-defense (Jan. 11, 2017),
https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/United-Kingdom-AttorneyGeneral-Speech-modern-law-of-self-defense-IISS.pdf.
78. Legality of the Use of Force (Yugo. v. Belg.), 1999 I.C.J. Pleadings 11-12 (May 10,
1999).
79. Koh, supra note 49.
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Along a similar vein, the U.S. accepts the legality of humanitarian
intervention because it (1) never perceives itself as violating
international law and (2) has stated that it would conduct humanitarian
interventions outside the U.N. Charter framework.80 If a country always
views its international actions as legal, states that it will operate in a
certain fashion, and does so, then it follows that the country supports the
legality of such operations. Kosovo represents the genesis of the United
States’ position on the matter. Although the U.S. never presented a
formal legal opinion for Operational Allied Force,81 it both participated
in a humanitarian intervention and presented a humanitarian
justification, among others, for the operation.82
The U.S. position on the legality of humanitarian intervention was
crystallized during the Obama administration. Its 2010 National
Security Strategy states that the U.S. and “all member states of the U.N.”
have recognized the responsibility to prevent humanitarian crises resides
in sovereign states but passes to the international community when those
states fail to prevent such crises or perpetrate them.83 This concept is
called the Responsibility to Protect and is the name of a 2001 report by
the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
(ICISS).84 At a speech in Stockholm later in his first term, President
Obama made the argument that the United States would be increasingly
confronted with humanitarian crises in the future and would be
compelled to act to uphold international norms despite not acting in selfdefense or lacking UNSC authorization.85 Shortly thereafter, President
Obama addressed the U.N. General Assembly and said, “sovereignty
cannot be a shield for tyrants” to commit human rights violations or for
the international community to do nothing in response.86
The Trump administration has continued the view of humanitarian
intervention as legal. The clearest expression of this view can be seen
in former U.N. Ambassador Nikki Haley’s statement at the UNSC, when
80. See Jack Goldsmith, Two Important Implications from President’s Press Conference
in Sweden, LAWFARE (Sept. 5, 2013, 7:37 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/twoimportant-implications-presidents-press-conference-sweden; see also Abratt, supra note 24,
at 24.
81. Note on NATO’s Intervention in Kosovo, supra note 68, at 1131-32.
82. Id.
83. THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 48 (2010),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strate
gy.pdf.
84. Nanda, supra note 9, at 5-6.
85. Goldsmith, supra note 80.
86. Text of Obama’s Speech at the U.N., N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/25/us/politics/text-of-obamas-speech-at-theun.html?ref=politics&pagewanted=all&pagewanted=print.
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she warned that the U.S. would act without UNSC authorization to
prevent humanitarian crises.87 On April 5, 2017, the U.K., France and
the U.S. brought forward a UNSC resolution to both condemn and
investigate a chemical weapons attack the Syrian government had
perpetrated a day earlier.88 Yet, Russia protected Syria by vetoing the
resolution.89 In response, Ambassador Haley stated, “[w]hen the United
Nations consistently fails in its duty to act collectively, there are times
in the life of states that we are compelled to take our own action.”90 On
April 7, the U.S. conducted a missile strike against a Syrian regime air
base.91
There is, however, a significant amount of opposition to the concept
of humanitarian intervention. Russia has been a vocal opponent of
humanitarian intervention when such opposition does not conflict with,
but rather complements, its foreign policy objectives.92 For example,
after NATO began Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, Russia introduced
a Security Council Resolution to condemn NATO’s campaign as a
“flagrant violation” of the U.N. Charter.93 Vladimir Putin has felt so
strongly about the illegality of humanitarian intervention taken outside
the U.N. Charter that he wrote an opinion editorial in the New York Times
in which he attempted to persuade the American public against military
action in Syria during the Obama Administration.94 He argued that
attacking the Assad regime (or humanitarian intervention in general)
would risk destroying the idea underpinning “the stability of
international relations”—the United Nation’s prohibition on the use of
force absent Security Council authorization—and might even risk the
United Nations suffering the “fate of the League of Nations.”95
Ironically, Russia would engage in its own humanitarian intervention
less than a year later in Crimea.96
Like Russia, China views humanitarian intervention as illegal. In
2018, China condemned the United States’ airstrike against the Syrian

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

See Abratt, supra note 24, at 24.
Id. at 23-24.
See id. at 24.
Id.
See id.
See, e.g., Note on NATO’s Intervention in Kosovo, supra note 68.
Id. at 1131.
See generally Vladimir V. Putin, Opinion, A Plea for Caution From Russia, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 11, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/12/opinion/putin-plea-forcaution-from-russia-on-syria.html.
95. See generally id.
96. See infra Part V.
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regime as violating international law.97 In addition, a group of 130
states, including China, issued the 2000 Declaration of the South
Summit, which rejected the concept of humanitarian intervention
because it has “no legal basis in the United Nations Charter.”98
The concept of R2P suggests that the international community is
reluctant to codify humanitarian intervention outside the confines of the
U.N. Charter. Both R2P’s original report and its final adoption in the
2005 World Summit Outcome stress the need to address humanitarian
crises through the UNSC.99 Although both versions conceive of the
possibility of a state acting without UNSC authorization, such as through
a General Assembly “Uniting for Peace” resolution,100 this non-UNSC
authorization mechanism would still require a state to act through an
organ of the U.N. and within its Charter.
An important distinction, however, does exist between R2P and the
World Summit Outcome. R2P does not completely adhere to the belief
that humanitarian interventions must occur within the confines of the
U.N. Charter. The ICISS envisioned that regional or sub-regional
organizations could conduct humanitarian interventions within their
boundaries when the UNSC rejects a proposal for legitimate
humanitarian intervention.101 Such an action would directly contravene
Article 53(1) of the U.N. Charter, which states that “no enforcement
action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional
agencies without the authorization of the Security Council . . . .”102 This
suggests that some members of the international community do believe
in the legality of humanitarian intervention. Canada, for example, can
be counted among those members since it created ICISS for the express
purpose of addressing the tension between humanitarian intervention
and state sovereignty.103 Another example of ICISS’ willingness to
circumvent UNSC authorization of humanitarian interventions is evident

97. See Laura Zhou & Agence France-Presse, China opposes Western air strikes on
Syria, calls for talks, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Apr. 14, 2018, 6:15 PM),
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2141732/china-opposeswestern-airstrikes-syria-calls-talks.
98. See Akande, supra note 24; see also GROUP OF 77 SOUTH SUMMIT, DECLARATION
OF THE SOUTH SUMMIT (2000), https://www.g77.org/summit/Declaration_G77Summit.htm.
99. R2P, supra note 48, at para. 6.13; Responsibility to Protect, UNITED NATIONS, OFF.
ON
GENOCIDE
PREVENTION
&
RESPONSIBILITY
TO
PROTECT,
https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-to-protect.shtml (last visited
Apr. 6, 2021) [hereinafter World Summit Outcome].
100. R2P, supra note 48, at para. 6.7; see World Summit Outcome, supra note 99, at para.
139.
101. R2P, supra note 48, at paras. 6.28, 6.31.
102. U.N. Charter art. 53, ¶ 1.
103. World Summit Outcome, supra note 99.
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in the organization’s concern about the improper use of UNSC
permanent member veto power.104
Despite these counterarguments, states’ retroactive praise for
humanitarian intervention points to the conclusion that states do
generally accept the practice as legal. For example, Australia, Canada,
France, Germany, Israel, Japan, Spain, Italy, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and
Turkey all expressed support for President Trump’s 2017 missile strike
against a Syrian airbase in response to the Assad regime’s use of
chemical weapons against civilians.105 Additionally, more nations
supported than opposed or condemned the April 2018 airstrikes against
Syria’s chemical weapons infrastructure.106 Thirty-nine countries
expressed their support for the strikes, including all twenty-nine
members of NATO,107 while seventeen countries condemned the
strike.108 It would appear that the legality of humanitarian intervention,
albeit in highly limited circumstances, has become a popular view
among states.
Furthermore, France’s participation in the April 2018 airstrikes
against Syria provides additional evidence that it accepts the legality of
humanitarian intervention. After it had conducted the strikes, France
justified its actions by alluding to their legality.109 At an emergency
session of the United Nations Security Council the French ambassador
stated:
[o]ur action is in full conformity with the objectives and values
enshrined in the United Nations Charter, from its very first lines. Our
organisation aims to ‘establish conditions under which justice and
respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of
international law can be maintained.’110

Taken with its participation in Operation Allied Force in 1999,
France’s participation in the April 2018 strike and subsequent
justification suggest that the French government accepts the legality of
humanitarian intervention. This would mean that a majority of the

104. See infra Part V.
105. Schmitt & Ford, supra note 51.
106. Alonso Gurmendi Dunkelberg et al., Mapping States’ Reactions to the U.S. Strikes
Against Syria of April 2018 – A Comprehensive Guide, JUST SECURITY (May 7, 2018),
https://www.justsecurity.org/55835/mapping-states-reactions-syria-strikes-april-2018-acomprehensive-guide/.
107. Id.; Associated Press, NATO’s 29 members support Syria airstrikes: NATO chief,
CTV NEWS (Apr. 14, 2018, 12:27 PM), https://www.ctvnews.ca/world/nato-s-29-memberssupport-syria-airstrikes-nato-chief-1.3885258.
108. Dunkelberg et al., supra note 106.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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permanent members on the United Nations Security Council support the
legality of humanitarian intervention.
Russia’s failed attempts to condemn humanitarian interventions at
the United Nations Security Council lends additional support to the idea
that states do accept the legality of humanitarian intervention outside the
U.N. Charter. After the April 2018 air strikes against the Syrian regime,
Russia introduced, but failed to pass, a United Nations Security Council
Resolution condemning aggression against Syria perpetrated by the
United States, the United Kingdom, and France.111 Eight countries voted
against Russia’s proposed resolution—the U.S., the U.K., France, the
Netherlands, Sweden, Kuwait, Poland, and Ivory Coast—and four
abstained, while only two countries voted with Russia—Bolivia and
China.112 Russia also attempted to condemn NATO’s bombing
campaign against Serbia as illegal, but failed because twelve members
of the United Nations Security Council disagreed with Russia’s
characterization of the operation.113 Indeed, Argentina, Bahrain, Brazil,
Canada, France, Gabon, Gambia, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Slovenia,
the U.K., and the U.S. voted against Russia’s proposed resolution.114
V. POLICY ARGUMENT
The legal argument for the existence of a humanitarian intervention
exception under customary international law is, admittedly, a close call.
Therefore, it is necessary to assess whether accepting the humanitarian
intervention exception or not would yield the best outcome. Upon
completing such an analysis, it is clear that customary international law
should be interpreted to allow humanitarian interventions because its
benefits outweigh its disadvantages and would result in a more just
world. Furthermore, states’ abuse of humanitarian intervention—the
main policy argument against accepting humanitarian intervention as a
customary law exception—can be mitigated by adherence to rules about
such interventions. An analysis of R2P’s rules for engaging in
humanitarian intervention shows that legitimate actions, such as the U.S.
airstrikes against Syria, would be allowed while illegitimate actions,
such as Russia’s annexation of Crimea, would not.
111. Doug Stanglin et al., Pentagon: U.S. allied strike set back Syrian chemical weapons
program
‘for
years’,
USA
TODAY
(Apr.
14,
2018,
8:43
AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2018/04/14/us-missile-strike-syria-russiacondemns-aggression/517062002/.
112. U.N. rejects Russian attempt to condemn U.S. ‘aggression’ on Syria, HINDU (Apr.
14, 2018, 6:36 PM), https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/un-rejects-russianattempt-to-condemn-us-aggression-on-syria/article23541095.ece.
113. U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 3989th mtg. at 5-6, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3989 (Mar. 26, 1999).
114. Id. at 6.
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A. The Advantage of the Humanitarian Intervention Exception
The main advantage of recognizing a humanitarian intervention
exception is the ability to stop humanitarian crises that would have
continued were it not for such an intervention. It is certainly morally
just for a group of states to stop such crises. In 1999, should NATO have
left Albanian Kosovars to the ethnic cleansing, rapes, and massacres
perpetrated by Slobodan Milosevic’s forces?115 The answer is no. States
should not be forced to stand aside and watch preventable mass human
suffering, or to allow “the horror to unfold,” as former U.N. SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan phrased it.116 If a humanitarian intervention
exception exists, there is at least the possibility that such horrors could
be stopped or mitigated.
B. Mitigating the Disadvantages of Humanitarian Intervention
Exception
The main disadvantage to accepting the humanitarian intervention
exception is that states might abuse such interventions to achieve their
own strategic objectives. While certainly legitimate, this concern can be
minimized with an accompanying set of guidelines accepted as part of
the customary law exception. The ICISS was aware of the potential for
abuse when it wrote R2P and included six factors that an intervention
would have to meet in order to be legal.117 They are: (1) right authority;
(2) just cause; (3) right intention; (4) last resort; (5) proportional means;
and (6) reasonable prospects.118
In terms of right authority, the ICISS stipulated that UNSC
authorization should be sought before launching any sort of
humanitarian intervention.119 As R2P states, “[t]here is no better or more
appropriate body than the United Nations Security Council to authorize
military intervention for human protection purposes.”120 If the UNSC
refused to authorize the military action for whatever reason, then the
matter could be taken to the floor of the UN General Assembly for a nonbinding “Uniting for Peace” procedure, or action could be taken by a
regional organization.121

115. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UNDER Orders: WAR CRIMES IN KOSOVO 109 (2001),
https://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/kosovo/part_two.pdf.
116. Press Release, Secretary General, Secretary-General Presents His Annual Report to
General Assembly, U.N. Press Release SG/SM/7136, GA/9596 (Sept. 20, 1999).
117. Abratt, supra note 24, at 57.
118. Id.; R2P, supra note 48, at para. 4.16.
119. R2P, supra note 48, at XII.
120. Id.
121. Id. at XIII.
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Just cause, the second factor, means that there must be serious and
irreparable harm occurring to human beings or imminently likely to
occur.122 The ICISS laid out two broad situations that, in its opinion,
would justify the use of force. The first is the “large scale loss of life,
actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the product
either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a
failed state situation.”123 The second is large-scale “ethnic cleansing.”124
Interestingly, the ICISS explicitly stated that it would not quantify “large
scale.”125
The third factor is the right intention of military intervention. While
R2P recognizes that a military intervention may have multiple
purposes,126 it is taken with the right intention when its primary purpose
is to stop or mitigate human suffering.127
Fourth, the humanitarian intervention must be taken as a last resort,
meaning that it can only be justified if every non-military option to
resolve the situation has been explored.128 “This does not necessarily
mean that every such option must literally have been tried and failed.”129
R2P recognizes that this is simply not realistic due to time constraints.130
Yet, there must be “reasonable grounds” for the conclusion that a given
option would not work, based on all the circumstances of the situation.131
The fifth factor concerns proportional means to the ascertained
threat. According to R2P, a military intervention uses proportional
means when the “scale, duration and intensity” of the intervention is the
“minimum necessary to secure the humanitarian objective in
question.”132
Finally, the military intervention must have a reasonable prospect
of successfully “halting or averting the atrocities . . . that triggered the
intervention in the first place.”133 The ICISS seemed to be most
concerned about the possibility of a military intervention making a
situation worse, even if it was taken for a humanitarian purpose.134

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at para. 4.18.
Id. at para. 4.19.
Id.
R2P, supra note 48, at para. 4.21.
See id. at para. 4.35.
See id. at para. 4.33.
Id. at XII.
Id. at para. 4.37.
Id.
R2P, supra note 48, at para. 4.37.
Id. at para. 4.39.
Id. at para. 4.41.
Id.
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The following two sections will apply R2P’s factors to two
situations—the United States’ airstrikes against Syria and Russia’s
annexation of Crimea—and will illustrate how rules for engaging in
humanitarian intervention would allow for legitimate humanitarian
interventions and would recognize the illegality of illegitimate
humanitarian interventions.
1. U.S. Airstrikes in Syria
U.S. airstrikes against the Syrian regime comply with R2P’s factors
for humanitarian intervention.
First, the administration’s airstrikes against the Assad regime in
Syria were taken with the right authority due to Russia’s improper use
of its Security Council veto. The ICISS considered the Security Council
veto, which each permanent member of the UNSC wields, as the
principal obstacle to stopping humanitarian crises and lamented the
unconscionable fact that “one veto can override the rest of humanity on
matters of grave humanitarian concern.”135 To address this issue the
ICISS supported prohibiting permanent members of the UNSC from
using their veto power in situations where their “vital national interests”
were not involved.136 Russia has violated that prohibition. In August of
2013, the UNSC failed to reach an agreement on a U.K. proposed
resolution that would have authorized the use of military force against
the Syrian regime.137 More recently, in April of 2018, Russia used its
veto power to defeat an American UNSC resolution to investigate
chemical weapons attacks in Syria.138
Russia will certainly claim that its intervention in Syria and support
of Bashar al-Assad are vital to its national interests. Indeed, Russia
views its actions in Syria as a conduit to be seen as a global power and
to counter the spread of Islamic extremism by maintaining stability in
the Middle East.139 The problem with the former assertion is that it is
amorphous; there is no limit to when and where this justification could
be used. The latter, while superficially plausible, fails for two reasons.
135. Id. at para. 6.20.
136. Id. at para. 6.21.
137. Syria resolution authorizing military force fails in U.N. Security Council, CBS NEWS
(Aug. 28, 2013, 4:48 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/syria-resolution-authorizingmilitary-force-fails-in-un-security-council/.
138. Merrit Kennedy, Russia Vetoes U.S. Resolution On Syria In U.N. Security Council,
NPR
(Apr.
10,
2018,
2:48
PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2018/04/10/601153602/u-n-security-council-meets-about-syria-as-inspectors-prepareto-head-in.
139. See Becca Wasser, The Limits of Russian Strategy in the Middle East, RAND CORP.
3-4 (2019), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE300/PE340/RAND
_PE340.pdf.
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The first reason is that humanitarian intervention would not stop Russia
from achieving its objective: Bashar al-Assad would likely remain in
power, and stability in the region would be maintained. Following the
Security Council backed deposal of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya in
2011,140 Russia most likely feared that approval of a military
intervention would mean the destruction of Bashar al-Assad’s regime.
Yet, Syria’s situation differed from that in Libya for one important
reason—international support of the targeted leader. Whereas Gaddafi
could not depend on the support of any major nation,141 Assad could
count on Iran’s support and its various Shia militias and Russia.142 Those
countries’ commitment to the survival of the Assad regime would be a
critical factor in American policymakers’ decision-making regarding
whether to depose Assad and would, most likely, serve as a deterrent
against intervention.143 As one commentator put it, Iran and Russia’s
backing of the Syrian regime “effectively put an end to any realistic
expectation of forced regime change in Syria in the foreseeable
future.”144 Second, Russia has a serious problem with domestic Islamic
extremism, as evidenced by the several terrorist attacks made in Russian
cities and the ongoing jihadist insurgency in the Caucasus mountains.145
Yet, the prevalence of Islamic extremist groups in Syria could actually
be helping the situation in Russia.146 Having found more fertile ground
for jihad, many extremists have fled to Syria, which has in turn reduced
the amount of violence in the Caucasus.147
140. See Richard Roth, U.N. Security Council approves no-fly zone in Libya, CNN (Mar.
18,
2011,
2:52
PM),
https://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/03/17/libya.civil.war/index.html?hpt=T2.
141. The support of Venezuela and Zimbabwe was unlikely to shift the debate. See Thair
Shaikh, Libya can still count on a few allies, CNN (Mar. 10, 2011, 5:38 PM),
https://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/03/04/libya.allies/index.html.
142. See Michel Duclos, Russia and Iran in Syria– a Random Partnership or an Enduring
Alliance?, ATLANTIC COUNCIL 1-2 (June 2019), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/06/Russia_and_Iran_in_Syria_a_Random_Partnership_or_an_Endurin
g_Alliance.pdf.
143. See Christopher J. Bolan, U.S. Strategy in Syria is Dangerously Adrift, FOREIGN
POL’Y RES. INST. (Apr. 1, 2019), https://www.fpri.org/article/2019/04/u-s-strategy-in-syriais-dangerously-adrift/.
144. Id.
145. Colin P. Clarke, Russia Is Not a Viable Counterterrorism Partner for the United
States, RAND CORP.: RAND BLOG (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/02/russiais-not-a-viable-counterterrorism-partner-for.html; Valery Dzutsati, Despite Demise of
Insurgency in North Caucasus, Russian Authorities Still Wary of Its Remnants, JAMESTOWN
FOUND. (May 20, 2020, 6:27 PM), https://jamestown.org/program/despite-demise-ofinsurgency-in-north-caucasus-russian-authorities-still-wary-of-its-remnants/.
146. See INT’L CRISIS GRP., THE NORTH CAUCASUS INSURGENCY AND SYRIA: AN
EXPORTED JIHAD? i, 6-7 (2016), https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/238-the-northcaucasus-insurgency-and-syria-an-exported-jihad.pdf.
147. See id. at i, Dzutsati, supra note 145.
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Second, President Trump’s air strikes against Syrian government
targets fit the just cause requirement because they were taken in response
to chemical attacks that caused large scale loss of life to civilians.148
Between the 2017 and 2018 attacks, President Bashar al-Assad killed
more than 120 of his own citizens.149
Third, the strikes were taken with the right intention because their
primary purpose was to “halt or avert human suffering.”150 After Syria’s
2017 chemical weapons attack, President Trump described the attack as
“a disgrace to humanity” and continued by stating that “[t]hese heinous
actions by the Assad regime cannot be tolerated. The United States
stands with our allies across the globe to condemn this horrific attack
. . . .”151 After the 2018 chemical attack and the United States’
subsequent air strikes, President Trump rhetorically asked why Iran and
Russia would want to ally themselves to Syria, a nation associated with
the “mass murder of innocent men, women and children?”152 Of course,
actions taken in the international arena almost always have multiple
purposes. Yet, all R2P requires is that halting or averting human
suffering be the primary purpose of the intervention.153 Given the highly
limited and precise nature of the strikes—attacking an airbase from
which the chemical attack originated in 2017 and attacking Assad’s
chemical weapons infrastructure in 2018—it is plausible that the strikes
were primarily about halting or averting human suffering. 154 Launching
cruise missiles and conducting airstrikes against a couple targets in Syria
certainly does not indicate a strategy of regime change.
Fourth, the U.S. had already attempted to end the crisis
diplomatically, therefore, the strikes were done as a last resort.155 As
previously mentioned, the United States has tried multiple times to pass
a UNSCR concerning the Syrian civil war and the Syrian government’s
use of chemical weapons, but was prevented by Russia and China.156
More importantly, the United States did persuade Syria to give up its
chemical weapons through diplomacy in 2013.157 Although the naiveté
of such an action is debatable, the United States’ creation of a diplomatic
148. R2P, supra note 48, at para. 4.20; see Masterson, supra note 14.
149. Syria chemical ‘attack’, supra note 3; Cooper, supra note 3.
150. R2P, supra note 48, at para. 4.33; Dana Bash et al., Trump on Syria’s Assad:
‘Something
should
happen’,
CNN
(Apr.
6,
2017,
10:26
PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2017/04/06/politics/donald-trump-syria-options/index.html.
151. Bash et al., supra note 150.
152. Masterson, supra note 14.
153. R2P, supra note 48, at para. 4.33.
154. See Sanders-Zakre, supra note 8.
155. R2P, supra note 48, at para. 4.37; Abratt, supra note 24, at 63-65.
156. Schmitt & Ford, supra note 51.
157. See Sanders-Zakre, supra note 8.
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agreement to solve the issue, and Syria’s subsequent violation of that
agreement, shows that military intervention was a last resort.
Fifth, the strikes were also proportional because they were limited
to airbases and Assad’s chemical weapons infrastructure.158 R2P
requires that the military action taken must be the minimum necessary
to achieve the desired result.159 In the realm of kinetic military action, it
is almost impossible to envision an intervention more limited than those
conducted by the Trump administration in 2017 and 2018.
Sixth, the strikes had a reasonable prospect of success because they
stood a reasonable chance of halting the chemical weapon attacks and
because the strikes did not worsen the situation. In terms of the former,
the strikes destroyed, or at least attempted to destroy, Bashar al-Assad’s
means of using chemical weapons and attempted to deter their further
use.160 The 2017 strike targeted Shayrat airbase because it was used to
store chemical weapons and housed the aircraft used to deploy them.161
The 2018 strike targeted a research center for developing, producing, and
testing chemical weapons technology and chemical weapons storage
sites.162 The U.S. military believed that the strike had at least done some
damage to Assad’s ability to use chemical weapons.163 Indeed, after the
attack, U.S. Lieutenant General Kenneth McKenzie asserted that the
strikes had “set the Syrian chemical weapons program back for years.”164
Moreover, when writing R2P, the ICISS was responding to
Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s millennium challenge and was
concerned with the humanitarian crises of the 1990s: Rwanda and
various crises emanating from the breakup of Yugoslavia.165 As a result,
this factor stipulates that a country’s humanitarian intervention must not
make a situation worse than if no action were taken.166 President
Trump’s strikes are consistent with this factor because the strikes did not
exacerbate Syrian civilian’s suffering by directly harming or killing
them, or by prolonging the civil war.

158. R2P, supra note 48, at para. 4.39; Abratt, supra note 24, at 66.
159. R2P, supra note 48, at para. 4.39; Abratt, supra note 24, at 65.
160. R2P, supra note 48, at para. 4.41; see Abratt, supra note 24, at 67.
161. See Syria war: Why was Shayrat airbase bombed?, BBC (Apr. 7, 2017),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-39531045.
162. See US-led strikes on Syria: What was hit?, BBC (Apr. 16, 2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-43769332.
163. Id.
164. Id.; Stanglin et al., supra note 111.
165. See R2P, supra note 48, at VII-VIII.
166. Id. at para. 4.41.
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2. Russia’s Annexation of Crimea
Conversely, Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea would not comply
with R2P’s factors and would, therefore, be illegal. President Putin
argued that, among other reasons, Russia’s actions were a legal
humanitarian intervention because of the threat that the new nationalist
Ukrainian government posed to ethnic Russians in Crimea.167 The
annexation, however, does not comply with any of R2P’s factors.
First, the annexation of Crimea was not done with right authority.
Russia never sought Security Council authorization to launch a
humanitarian intervention in Crimea; Russia never submitted the matter
for consideration under a “Uniting for Peace” procedure; and Russia did
not act through a regional organization.168
Second, there was no “large scale loss of life” or “large scale ethnic
cleansing” being perpetrated against ethnic Russians that would rise to
the level of just cause envisioned by the ICISS.169 One might counter
that there existed a significant enough threat to ethnic Russians living in
Crimea to warrant Russia’s intervention. Vladimir Putin accused the
pre-2014 revolution Ukrainian government of discriminating against
ethnic Russians by forcing them to assimilate and stated that the postrevolution government would repress ethnic Russians.170 President
Putin even suggested that ethnic Russians might be subject to harsher
laws as the new Ukrainian government was the ideological heir of
“[Stepan] Bandera, Hitler’s [Ukrainian] accomplice during World War
II.”171 Yet, the ICISS specifically stated that it had “resisted any
temptation to identify as a ground for military intervention human rights
violations falling short of outright killing or ethnic cleansing,” such as
discrimination based on ethnicity.172
Third, Russia’s actions were not taken with the right intentions
because the primary purpose for the annexation was something other
than halting human suffering, such as recapturing former Soviet

167. See Transcript: Putin says Russia will protect the rights of Russians abroad, WASH.
POST (Mar. 18, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/transcript-putin-says-russiawill-protect-the-rights-of-russians-abroad/2014/03/18/432a1e60-ae99-11e3-a49e76adc9210f19_story.html.
168. See Steven Pifer, Five years after Crimea’s illegal annexation, the issue is no closer
to resolution, BROOKINGS (Mar. 18, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-fromchaos/2019/03/18/five-years-after-crimeas-illegal-annexation-the-issue-is-no-closer-toresolution/.
169. R2P, supra note 48, at para. 4.19.
170. See Transcript, supra note 167.
171. Id.
172. R2P, supra note 48, at para. 4.25.
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territories,173 securing a port for the Black Sea Fleet,174 or ensuring
domestic regime security.175
Fourth, even if the annexation of Crimea was taken with the right
intention for a just cause, it was not a last resort. To the extent that the
operation was a humanitarian one—Vladimir Putin’s humanitarian
justification is suspect at best—Russia never tried to resolve whatever
grievance it had with the Ukrainian government concerning ethnic
Russians in Crimea diplomatically.
Fifth, Russia’s annexation was also not proportional because it was,
by no stretch of the imagination, the minimum necessary to achieve the
desired result.
The final factor, reasonable prospects for success, is somewhat
difficult to analyze because it raises the question of whether Russia’s
annexation made the humanitarian situation better rather than worse.
This means that there must have been a humanitarian crisis that
necessitated the intervention. As mentioned previously, there was no
large-scale crisis, and Russia annexed Crimea for motives other than a
humanitarian one. It is, therefore, impossible to answer whether a nonexistent and non-imminent humanitarian crisis was made better by
annexation.
VI. CONCLUSION
The United States’ use of military force against the Assad regime
is legal under international law because there is a customary
international law exception to the U.N. Charter’s prohibition on the use
of force—humanitarian intervention. Furthermore, the customary
international law exception should exist because its advantages outweigh
its disadvantages and would lead to a more just world.
The discussion and analysis of humanitarian intervention raises
several additional thoughts that must be addressed before ending. First,
if humanitarian intervention is an illegal violation of the prohibition on
the use of force then perhaps there is something wrong with the current
international legal system. The United Nations was “built upon the idea
of sovereignty for all its members,” and it is the organization’s main
concern.176 Yet does that mean that fundamental human rights must be
173. See Daniel Treisman, Why Putin Took Crimea: The Gambler in the Kremlin, 95
FOREIGN AFF. 47, 47 (2016), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2016-0418/why-russian-president-putin-took-crimea-from-ukraine.
174. Id. at 48.
175. Michael McFaul et al., Faulty Powers: Who Started the Ukraine Crisis?, 93 FOREIGN
AFF.
167,
170
(2014),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/eastern-europecaucasus/2014-10-17/faulty-powers.
176. Abratt, supra note 24, at 35.
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forever subordinate to a state’s inviolable sovereignty? Must states be
forced do nothing and watch a genocide unfold for fear of infringing on
another state’s sovereignty? After Operation Allied Force, former
Secretary of State Madeline Albright stated that, “[t]he crisis in Kosovo
should cause a re-examination of the paradigms of the past. As the world
has changed, so have the roles of key institutions such as the EU, NATO
and the United Nations.”177 Indeed, those paradigms—primarily
absolute state sovereignty—are increasingly incongruent with the
morality and nature of the modern world.
Second, to what extent does conducting humanitarian interventions,
to the extent they are illegal, erode the rule of law and risk the destruction
of the current international system based on the United Nations? Some
scholars of international law share a similar opinion with Vladimir Putin,
that humanitarian intervention outside the U.N. framework could result
in the end of the United Nations system.178 Other scholars question the
role the United Nations has played in preserving international peace and
argue that the current system might not be worth keeping.179 Michael
Glennon, for example, claimed that “[d]iplomatic historians have yet to
identify a single instance of interstate violence that was actually stopped
by the United Nations.”180 This raises the question: would violating the
current international order by conducting a humanitarian intervention
really be a net negative occurrence?
Third, does international law matter? History has shown that if
states, especially powerful ones, determine that a certain course of action
is in their interests, then they will take such action despite its illegality.
Similarly, if a state determines that conducting a humanitarian military
operation is morally just and not too costly, then it will conduct the
operation even if it is illegal. There have certainly been no serious
reprisals levied against states for conducting legitimate humanitarian
interventions. All this lends credence to the idea that it really does not
matter what international law is. What matters is power, and a state’s
will to use it. Perhaps the fundamental nature of international relations
has not changed too much over time and can still be accurately described
by the statement the Athenians made to the Melians in Thucydides’
Peloponnesian War: “since you know as well as we do that right, as the
177. Madeleine K. Albright, To Win the Peace . . ., WALL ST. J. (June 14, 1999, 12:01
AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB929319276835175074.
178. See Putin, supra note 94; see Hathaway & Shapiro, supra note 57 (arguing that use
of military force without the authorization of the Security Council endangers the United
Nations system).
179. See, e.g., Michael J. Glennon, The New Interventionism: The Search for a Just
International Law, 78 FOREIGN AFF. 2, 4 (1999).
180. Id.
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world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong
do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”181

181. THE LANDMARK THUCYDIDES: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO THE PELOPONNESIAN
WAR 352 (Robert B. Strassler ed., Simon & Schuster 1996).

